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1. Introduction
L abour Law is a field where traditionally informal procedures areoften used. While formal procedures may take long, informal proce-
dures should settle matters in a relatively short time. Informal procedures
should also be cheaper and therefore attractive for workers who are
afraid they can not afford the high salaries of lawyers in case they loose
their case. The availability of informal procedures should make it easier
for workers to defend their rights and therefore should promote the ob-
servance of labour law by employers.
In this paper a comparison will be made of the practice of formal and
informal procedures in Dutch and Japanese Labour Law. Of course, both
countries do also know informal procedures in other fields, like con-
sumer and rent law. However, the labour law example may give a good
impression of the different approach in both countries.
2. The Dutch system
A. THE FORMAL SYSTEM
Ordinary cases
Every labour dispute in the Netherlands can principally be brought be-
fore a court. The general courts are competent: unlike most European
countries, the Netherlands do not know a special system of labour courts.
* Gustav J.J. Heerma van Voss is Professor of Labour Law and Social Security at Lei-
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All civil disputes with regard to a contract of employment or a collective
agreement fall in first instance under the jurisdiction of the judge of the
cantonal court (kantonrechterj.! The cantonal court is always a single
judge. The decisions of the cantonal court are subject to appeal to the dis-
trict court (arrondissementsrechtbank). These cases are normally decided
in a chamber of three judges. After this, appeal in cassation is possible to
the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). The Hoge Raad decides in a chamber of
five judges.
The cantonal court is the court of first instance for petty offences in
criminal law, and small claims in civil law. Besides this, it deals with all
cases related to some specific contracts, like labour cases and the lease of
real property. The most important difference with the district courts is
that the cantonal judge is always sitting alone. The procedures are faster
than the district courts procedures and the parties are not obliged to have
a legal representative. In many cases a representative of a trade union or
insurance company, rather than an attorney defends workers. Sometimes,
they are not represented at all. The employer who wishes so, can send his
own staff members to defend his case in this court.
Procedures
The rules of procedure are foreseen in the Code of Civil Procedure (Wet-
boek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering). The ordinary procedure is the
contentious procedure. This procedure opens with a I dagvaarding,' direct-
ed to the other party and including summons, complaint and the facts on
which the complaints are based. This procedure is used for most labour
cases. Cases for the cantonal court may take a few months up to two
years, depending on the amount of witnesses, complexity and urgency of
the case and the activities of the parties. Normally, an ordinary case is
handled within six months. Appeal cases use to take longer, normally
about a year. If the case reaches the Supreme Court, it may decide five
1 An exception is being made for the director (member of the executive board) of a
stock or limited-liability company. For this employee the court of first instance is the
district court. In appeal the court of appeal is competent.
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years after the original procedure was started. In extreme principle cases,
in which the Court of Justice of the European Communities is asked for a
preliminary decision, this period will be even longer. For instance, a land-
mark case of a mrs. Dekker, who was refused a job because of her preg-
nancy in 1981, was finally decided in 1991 by the Supreme Court.
Dissolution ofemployment contracts
A special, but frequently used procedure to end an employment contract
is the dissolution-procedure.
In most cases it is the employer who sends a request to the cantonal
judge to dissolve the employment contract on severe grounds, more
specifically a change of circumstances (art. 7:685 Dutch Civil Code). In
these procedures different procedural rules are applicable. They are sub-
ject to so-called voluntary jurisdiction. This is a special procedure, initiat-
ed by a request to the court, which organises a hearing by itself. The rules
of evidence are lighter in this procedure. Usually the decision is made
within a few weeks. Although principally the different procedure in these
cases is not very logic, in practice the advantage is the short time in
which it leads to a decision. Appeal against the judgement of the cantonal
court in a dissolution-procedure is not allowed. Only in case the court vi-
olated certain procedural rules, appeal is allowed. Also the Procurer-Gen-
eral of the Supreme Court is allowed to bring cases before the Supreme
Court 'in the interest of law.' This procedure is practically important for
future cases; the position of the parties involved in the particular case
cannot be changed by the result. This procedure is seldom followed. The
lack of the possibility of appeal is criticised by many lawyers. However,
many practising labour lawyers feel comfortable with it: it leads to a defi-
nite decision within a short period.
Summary procedures
In case of urgency, it is possible to ask the cantonal court to give a provi-
sional order. This can also be asked from the President of the District
Court in a so-called 'short procedure' (Kort geding). However, in these
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cases the courts can not take a final decision. It is always possible that the
ordinary procedure leads to another solution in the end. In many cases,
parties are guided by the provisional order. The principal case would
take too long to wait for, and they prefer to accept the provisional deci-
sion as the definitive solution, or as the basis for further negotiations to
reach a settlement.
B. THE INFORMAL SYSTEM
Since World War II, the Netherlands know an informal procedure in case
of dismissals. Every employer that wants to dismiss an employee must
ask permission from the Regional Director of the Employment Office
(RDA).2 This is regulated in the Extraordinary Decree on Labour Rela-
tions (BBA) of 1945, originally a piece of emergency legislation that was
enacted by the government at the end of World War II. The BBA re-
mained over the years in spite of pressure of employers to abolish it, es-
pecially in periods of economic decline. The BBA worked in the first
years of its existence as a measure to restore order on the labour market.
Later it developed into a protection for workers to ensure that dismissals
had a just reason. It also was used as an instrument of government to in-
fluence the labour market and to check the access to unemployment ben-
efits. The procedure is the following. The employer sends a request to the
RDA, which contains the grounds for dismissal and the motivation for it.
The RDA might ask the employer for additional information (like ac-
countant reports). The RDA enables the employee to defend himself in
writing. A committee consisting of representatives of employers' associa-
tions and trade unions advises the RDA on the basis of both documents.
Most of these advises are unanimous and in that case the RDA will fol-
low it. In most cases the permission for dismissal is granted. However, if
the request is not serious enough, it is possible that in the beginning of
the procedure this is made clear to the employer, and as a result, the re-
quest will be either withdrawn or reformulated.
2 Regionaal Directeur voor de Arbeidsvoorzieningsorganisatie.
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In case of collective dismissals, the employer has to negotiate with
unions first before he asks permission to dismiss' This rule, based on a
European Community Directive, has promoted self-regulation. It has lead
to the practice that companies conclude so-called 'social plans' with
unions. In the social plan, agreements are made for the way workers are
dismissed (like replacement, outplacement or financial compensation). If
the unions accept the collective dismissal in such an agreement, the RDA
and/or the court will only marginally check the grounds for collective
dismissal.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the BBA-procedure came under fire, be-
cause during this period of recession it took too long before the decision
to permit dismissal was taken. The restrictions were felt as obstructive for
the often-necessary rapid reduction of the workforce of companies in fi-
nancial problems.
Access to a court
Also legal arguments against the BBA-procedure got more attention. The
decision of the RDA is not subject to appeal to a court. It was argued that
this is a violation of article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which requires access to a court with regard to the determination
of civil rights and obligations. The Dutch Government took the position
that there is access to a court:
• The employer who does not gets permission to dismiss from the
RDA can go the cantonal court to request dissolution of the employment
contract."
• The employee who is dismissed with permission of the RDA can ask
for damages or reinstatement on the basis of 'apparently unjustified dis-
missal."
• In case of improper handling of cases by the RDA, one can claim
damages from the State. The District court in The Hague declared itself
3 Act on Notice of Collective dismissals (Wet Melding Collectief Ontslag).
4 Article 7:685 BW (Dutch Civil Code).
5 Article 7:681 and 682 BW (Dutch Civil Code).
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competent in these cases." Also complaints may be filed to the National
Ombudsman, which also may lead to compensation of damages.
However, these procedures do not imply a full revision of the RDA-
decision. And an order to reinstate the employee can always be bought
off by the employer. It is questionable whether the present situation is
sustainable in the future when a case might be brought before the Euro-
pean Courts of Human Rights in Strasbourg.7
Alternative ways for employers
Deregulation attempts in the 1980s had not much effect, although proce-
dures were speeded up. In practice, employers found other ways to deal
with the need to reduce their personnel:
• More often, employees were hired on a temporary contract.
• The use of other forms of flexible labour relations was extended: so-
called on-call contracts and temporary workers (dispatched workers).
• Older personnel was laid-off by the use of early retirement-schemes.
• The schemes for disabled benefits were abused to solve personnel
problems of companies.f
-Jn case of the need for a dismissal, the alternative procedure of dis-
solution of the employment contract by the cantonal judge was often
used.
Dissolution of the employment contract
The alternative procedure of dissolution of the employment contract by
the cantonal court became very popular during the 1990s. There are sev-
eral reasons to explain this preference for a more formal procedure:
6 District Court The Hague July 6, 1988, NJCM-Bulletin (1988) 181 (Pally).
7 In the past the former European Commission on Human Rights held up the BBA-
procedure. However, a comparable Austrian procedure was not accepted by the Court,
ECHRJune 28,1990, Series A, Vol. 179 (Obermeier).
8 These schemes are far more used in the Netherlands than in comparable other
countries.
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• In case the worker is sick, dismissal is not allowed." dissolution is
then the only way to terminate the contract. Sometimes workers get sick
during the BBA-procedure. In order to prevent further delay, the employ-
er often anticipated this by immediately starting the dissolution-proce-
dure.
• In the dissolution-procedure the court often excepts the opinion of
the employer that the contract should be ended. If the reason for termina-
tion is not very strong, this will be compensated in the sum that the em-
ployer will have to pay to the employee. But employers often prefer this
above the risk that the RDA will refuse to give permission for a dismissal.
• Lawyers who advise employers often prefer the legal knowledge of
the cantonal court and the correct and open procedure that they follow,
above the unpredictable 'black box' of the RDA.
During the 1990s, the dissolution-procedure became so popular that,
in 1998, the cantonal courts received even more requests for dissolution
than the RDA's received requests for permission for dismissal. Because of
the unpredictability of the severance payments that were to be granted in
dissolution-cases, certain formulas were developed to calculate these
payments. It was more and more criticised that there was no official
recognised formula. Therefore in 1996, the Circle of Cantonal Judges (a
society of these judges without any formal competence) decided to give
Recommendations. These recommendations content procedural rules and
a method to calculate severance payments. Today this method is general-
ly accepted. They are used by a large majority of the cantonal courts, al-
though formally they are not bound, since the Recommendations are no
official legislation or other formal legal instrument.
Pro forma-procedures
A specific feature of the Dutch dismissal law is the practice of 'pro forma'-
procedures. This term is used for those procedures that are followed al-
though parties agree that the employment contract should be terminated.
Often such an agreement also foresees in a severance payment for the
9 Article 7:670 BW (Dutch Civil Code).
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employee. Nevertheless, the parties follow either the RDA-procedure or
the dissolution-procedure. This can be explained by the fact that the So-
cial Security Authorities will only provide the employee with an unem-
ployment benefit when his dismissal was not culpable. The fact that the
RDA or the court has checked the ground for dismissal will easily satisfy
the Social Security Authorities that such is the case. When an employer
and employee just agree to terminate the employment contract without
check of the RDA or the court, the question will be examined whether a
prolongation of the contract could have been expected from the employ-
ee. Therefore a considerable part of the requests for approval for dis-
missal from the RDA and for dissolution are of a 'pro forma'-nature.
Reinforcement of the BBA-procedure
In an attempt to renew his grip on the labour market the Minister of So-
cial Affairs and Employment tried to reinforce the BBA-procedure as 'the
highway of dismissal law.' He did so in the Act on Flexibility and Securi-
ty, that entered into force in 1999. The Act promoted the use of the RDA-
procedure by the following means:
• The prohibition to dismiss a sick employee is no longer effective
when the sickness came up after the RDA received the request for ap-
proval of dismissal.
• In case the RDA approves a dismissal purely on economic grounds,
the employee is guaranteed that the Social Security Authorities will not
consider his unemployment culpable.
• In case the employee gives the employer a statement of 'no objec-
tion' to a dismissal on economic grounds, the RDA will follow a short
procedure and decide within a few days.
• The RDA-procedures are made more efficient.
• In case the RDA-procedure is followed, the period of notice may be
reduced with one month. A minimum period of one month still has to be
observed in any case.
• The dissolution-procedure is made less attractive in two ways. In
case the worker is sick, a 'reintegration-plan' has to be submitted to the
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cantonal court, which is a bureaucratic burden on the employer. In case
the worker is granted a severance payment from the court, the unem-
ployment benefit will not be granted, before a term is observed that is
equal with the period of notice in case of an ordinary dismissaL
In practice, these attempts to promote the RDA-procedure seem to
have effect. Over the year 1999, in many more cases the RDA-procedure
was followed compared with the dissolution-procedure. On the other
hand, the high economic growth resulted in 1999 in problems to find per-
sonnel for many employers. This also might have changed the dismissal-
practice.
Other procedures
The procedures described above are the most general procedures used in
labour law-practice in the Netherlands. However, it must be noted, that
also other forms of informal procedures are used. The following can be
mentioned:
• In the field of education, the RDA-procedure is not applicable be-
cause of the constitutional freedom of education. Therefore committees
are installed by the national organisations of private schools. There are
committees for the catholic, protestant and neutral private schools that
decide on dismissals and other labour disputes in this field. During the
last century, it is discussed whether it is possible to exclude the access to
the official courts in these cases. It is also questioned that these commit-
tees have a really different approach than a court would have. Therefore
it is discussed whether the system should be changed or even abolished.
• Traditionally some branches knew a system of arbitration that was
obligatory in all labour cases in that field. Especially in the printing
branch this was a well-known phenomenon. However, employees can
only be obliged to use this system on a voluntary base.l" Therefore, this
system could only work under the regime of a 'closed shop': membership
of all employers and employees to the organisations that agreed on the
10 Again, article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms guarantees access to a court.
84 Heerma van Voss
collective agreement. The closed shop-policy however is today no longer
sustainable. This is a result of more individuality among employees, but
also because of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
with regard to the freedom of union membership. Since the decline in
membership in recent decades, this system is gradually weakened also in
branches were it was based on a long tradition.
• In collective labour law, arbitration committees in case of disputes
on the interpretation of collective agreements are often provided. They
deal with conflicts between the parties to the collective agreement (em-
ployers and unions). Sometimes also individual members may consult
the committees. Often employers and unions may appoint one member
of the committee and the two together appoint an independent chairper-
son. Decisions are made on the basis of the rules foreseen in the collective
agreement, which are often unspecific.
• Also committees are active in case of a restructure of a company.
Employer and unions use to agree certain conditions for the employees in
a so-called 'social plan.' Often the social plan also foresees in a committee
that can decide on conflicts that may arise during the process. The com-
mittees are often composed in the same way as the above-mentioned ar-
bitration-committees.
• In most disputes with regard to the rights of works councils the can-
tonal court is competent. But in these cases, the parties usually first must
ask mediation and advise of a so-called 'industrial committee' (bedrijfs-
commissie). This committee is composed of an equal amount of members
of management and labour in a specific branch. Because of its bipartite
composition, it is often not possible to reach a unanimous opinion within
the committee. Although their work might contribute to the final decision
of the court, there are many critics to their actual functioning.l!
• The General Act on Equal Treatment'? prohibits discrimination in
several fields with regard to religion, conviction, political opinion, race,
gender, nationality, sexual orientation or civil status. The Act also fore-
11 I.C.M. van Home, In het voorportaal van de rechter (Sdu; Den Haag 1997).
12 Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling.
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sees in a Committee on Equal Treatment.P The Committee can examine
whether a distinction is being made that is contrary to that Act or certain
articles of the Civil Code.l! Although the Committee can not give binding
decisions, it is often consulted, sometimes by both parties together. Its
opinions are published in yearbooks, that can help to prevent discrimina-
tion and to decide which distinctions are allowed and which are not.
However, the courts do not always follow the opinions of the Committee.
• During the first year of sickness of the employee, the employer has
to pay wages. However, it is possible that the company-doctor does not
recognise the illness. In that case, the employer may stop the payment of
the wages of the worker. The employee who wants to appeal against this,
is required to ask an advisory opinion from the doctor of the Social Secu-
rity Authorities. This advice will help the cantonal court to take a deci-
sion on the matter.
• In case of violation of the Health and Safety Act (Arbeidsom-
standighedenwet 1998) or Working Hours Act (Arbeidstijdenwet) em-
ployees can file a complaint to the Labour Inspectorate of the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment (Arbeidsinspectie). This inspectorate is
empowered to give instructions to employers to obey the law. If an em-
ployer fails to do so, the Labour Inspectorate may make an official report
and handle the case over to the prosecutor to start a criminal case. How-
ever, the prosecutor has a wide margin of discretion ('principle of oppor-
tunity') and many cases are dismissed because of fear that the case is not
hard enough to lead to a conviction by the court. However, since 1999,
the Labour Inspectorate is also enabled to force the employer to pay fines
in case of smaller offences. If the employer does not want to accept this, it
is up to him to go to the court. This will probably make the activities of
the Labour Inspectorate more efficient and effective.
• Some of the bigger companies know a system of internal grievance-
procedures. It implies that an employee may file a complaint against his
13 Commissie Gelijke Behandeling.
14 These articles 7:646-648 BW (Dutch Civil Code) foresee in a prohibition of discrim-
ination on grounds of sex and part-time-work.
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superior, a colleague or his treatment by the company. Normally an inde-
pendent committee is treating the complaint and will advise how to re-
spond to it. This system is useful for smaller disputes that do not justify
to go to a court. Attempts to give these procedures a legal basis failed
during the last decades.
• The actual tendency to promote mediation as a special form of alter-
native dispute resolution seems not to be too popular in labour law.
Probably this is caused by the many procedures that already exist. An-
other explanation is the need for the employee that the official proce-
dures are followed in dismissal cases, in order to obtain an unemploy-
ment benefit.
c. DEVELOPMENTS
The Dutch Government is undertaking a major reform of the judicial or-
ganisation. Part of this project is the integration of the cantonal courts
with the district courts. This would make the judicial organisation more
uniform and transparent, and give it a better administrative organisation.
This plan was criticised, because of the fear that the district court proce-
dures are more time consuming, costly and because the place of these
courts is often further away from the citizen. Also the judges of the can-
tonal courts resisted heavily against the integration in the bigger and
more bureaucratic district court organisations. Therefore, the government
found a compromise: the cantonal courts organisation will become mem-
ber of the district court-organisation, but the judges will continue to work
separated from the other district court judges and within their traditional
court houses in small places. In practice, it will imply that the integration
will be introduced more smoothly. Decisions in appeal will be attributed
to the Courts of Appeal. The operation should enter into force at January
1, 2002, but the legislation has still to pass both Chambers of Parliament.
The practical consequences of this development for the need for informal
procedures are not clear. Part of the project is also a modernisation of the
Code on civil procedures in order to speed up civil court procedures. It
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will depend on the success of these efforts how popular the formal proce-
dures will become.
During the discussions on the Act on Flexibility and Security in 1998,
both Chambers of Parliament opposed to the present complicated system
of procedures in dismissal-law. The Second Chamber (Lower House)
forced the Minister to examine whether there should be a change in the
system of severance payments. The First Chamber (Senate) went even
further and forced the Minister to install an Advisory Committee on the
so-called 'Dual System of Dismissals.v" This Committee reported in No-
vember 2000. The title of the report is clear: 'Farewell to the Dual System
of Dismissal Law.'16 Its advice promotes the abolition of the previous
check on dismissals by the government. It should be replaced by a hear-
ing of the worker by the employer in the presence of a counsel. The re-
port is now under consideration in several bodies, like the Foundation of
Labour (central organisations of employers and unions), the National So-
cial Insurance Institute, the Dutch Society of Judges and the Dutch Bar
Association.
3. The Japanese system
A. THE FORMAL SYSTEM
In Japan, civil labour disputes can be brought in first instance for the Dis-
trict Court. This is the ordinary court for all civil and criminal cases, ex-
cept those specifically stipulated by law to fall under the jurisdiction of
other courts. Most cases are handled by a single judge, serious cases by a
panel of three judges. In appeal the High Court is competent. Here, a
panel of three judges decides cases. Finally, appeal in cassation is allowed
to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decides either by the Grand
Bench (full court, in principal cases) or a petty Bench (three judges). The
Supreme court only decides on constitutional questions and questions of
15 Adviescommissie Duaal Ontslagstelsel (ADO).
16 Adviescommissie Duaal Ontslagstelsel, Afscheid va~ het duale ontslagrecht (Elsevier;
Doetinchem 2000).
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law. Finding of facts is limited to the courts of first and second instance.
Violations of the Labour Standards Act and the Trade Union Act are also
falling under criminal law. Principally, the same courts are competent.
Procedures may take three to four years, during which everyone or
two months hearings are held, to hear witnesses. Parties use to defend
their interests very extensively, because of the important interests that are
at stake. Although legal representation is no condition, usually a lawyer
represents the parties. In case a provisional decision is requested, in prin-
ciple no full procedure with exhausting evidence gathering is necessary.
However, in dismissal cases the court usually organises hearings and
asks for proof, which makes that these procedures often take a year.
These provisional decisions are in principle temporarily and may set
aside afterwards by an ordinary procedure in the same case. But like the
Dutch 'kort geding'-procedure, it often foresees in a permanent solution
because parties accept it. However, in principle the provisional decision-
procedure is submitted to the aim to preserve the pretended rights in
order to enable the parties to enforce them in the ordinary procedure.
One must prove that future rights are threatened, and make clear that
there is a reasonable chance that they will be recognised in a ordinary
procedure. It must also be possible to decide the question quickly.
Japan traditionally has a low litigation rate. The reasons for this are
usually sought in the fear for disturbance in the labour relation that is
caused by the starting of a procedure. However, the number of labour
cases before the courts has been increasing rapidly in recent years.
Informal Procedures in Japanese and Dutch Labour Law 89
Table: Number ofLabour-related civil cases received by Courts (All instances),
selected ueare'?
Regular procedure Provisional decision
1956 91 286
1966 627 605
1976 887 1070
1986 1043 806
1990 1035 426
1991 1099 445
1992 1523 555
1993 2110 716
1994 2523 836
B. THE INFORMAL SYSTEM
The most important system of informal procedures in Japan is based on
the Trade Union Law. Directly after World War II the Authorities of the
Allied Forces governed Japan. In order to break the power of the Japan-
ese War industry and to democratise Japanese society, they promoted the
introduction of trade unions in Japanese companies. In order to protect
the new unions, the Trade Union Law foresaw in procedures against em-
ployers who suppress unions, the so-called 'unfair labour practices.' To
this end 47 local Labour Relations Committees are installed and one Cen-
tral Labour Relations Committee in Tokyo.l" They decide in collective
(trade union as a whole) as well as individual (for instance dismissal re-
lated with union activities) cases.
17 Nakakubo 1996, source: Hooo Jiho [Lawyers Associations Journal] Vol. 47, no. 7
(1995) 169.
18 Besides this, special Labour Relations Committees exist for seafarers and local and
central Labour Relations Committees for Government Enterprises. A National Person-
nel Authority handles complaints of civil servants.
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The local and central Labour Relations Committees are independent
government-committees, composed of members who represent respec-
tively labour, management and the general interest. The last members are
practising lawyers and university professors. The president is appointed
from this group. The employee and employer-members are usually offi-
cials from trade unions and employers associations of managers of mid-
dle-sized and big companies. The members fulfil this task part-time. The
Labour Relations Committees deal with individual and collective cases.
Individual employees as well as unions can start the procedure.
The decisions of the Labour Relations Committees are binding for the
parties. If a party disagrees he may appeal to the Central Labour Rela-
tions Committee. The appeal to the District Court is possible after the de-
cision in first instance of the local Labour Relations Committee, as well as
after the decision of the Central Labour Relations Committee. It is possi-
ble that two decisions of Labour Relations Committees are followed by
three decisions of ordinary courts in the same case. These appeal proce-
dures are cases against the (Central) Labour Relations Committee. The
administrative procedural law is applicable."
There is no provisional decision foreseen, but the Labour Relations
Committees may give advice or recommendations. If parties follow these,
they do so voluntarily. But if the employer appeals to the District Court,
the possibility exists that the Labour Relations Committee asks for a spe-
cific type of provisional decision, the so-called 'kinkyu meirei.' In this
procedure the court can order the employer to obey the decision of the
Labour Relations Committee for the time of the appeal-procedure.
The procedures before the Labour Relations Committees were origi-
nally seen as an informal procedure that could lead to a decision in a
short time. In practice, the procedure is formalised, and it takes as long as
a provisional decision by the court. In every case three members are ap-
pointed to hear the case: one general interest-member, one employer-
member and one employee-member. They organise sessions that are
19 Also criminal cases against the employer because of violation of the Trade Union
Act or Labour Standards Act are possible. They fall outside the scope of this paper.
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open to the public. There is an extensive examination of evHiefi€€1)ifJ••
both parties are represented by lawyers. Also because the members of the
Labour Relations Committee do this work next to their ordinary work, it
takes a lot of time to organise the sessions. For a dismissal case because of
discrimination on ground of trade union-membership, usually three to
four sessions are held to hear witnesses. Because of the loaded agenda of
the members, one month lies between every two sessions. The formalisa-
tion is encouraged by the fact that full judicial review by the ordinary
courts afterwards is possible. The Labour Relations Committees are
therefore afraid to make mistakes.
The most important reason to bring the case before the Labour Rela-
tions Committee instead of going directly to a court, is the fact that the
Committees more often succeed in mediation. A dismissal case before the
court leads to a formal decision. If the employer looses the case he will
usually go in appeal. Thus, it may take years before the final decision is
made. This leads to a long period of uncertainty. Eventually, if the case is
lost, it will lead to high proceeding costs. It even takes very long to get a
provisional decision. In the Japanese system of lifetime employment, it is
also important for the employee not to loose his job. He is more served
with a settlement that will give him his job back, than with a financial
compensation.
As a result of the work of the panel of three members of the Labour
Relations Committee, in practice 70% of the cases are settled. In 400/0 of
the cases this happens in the presence of the panel. In the other 300/0 of
the cases parties settle themselves, but often on the basis of suggestions
from the panel. A settlement may imply a withdrawal of the dismissal, a
renewed employment, a 'voluntary' retirement after withdrawal of the
dismissal or an acceptance of the dismissal. In the last cases the employee
will collect a considerable amount of severance payment to compensate
the dismissaL
However, it must be noted that also the ordinary courts consider it as
important to achieve a settlement. It turns out that 43% of the ordinary
civil cases and 30% of the provisional decision-cases lead to a settlement
92 Heerma van Voss
during the hearing. Besides this, 24% of the ordinary civil cases and 23%
of the provisional decision-cases are withdrawn because a settlement is
reached outside the hearing. Judges are actively striving for this result,
because of their conviction that in labour disputes this is the best solu-
tion.
The following table makes clear that the differences are not as big as
the preference for the Labour Relations Committee-procedure suggests:
Settlement in Settlement out- No Settlement
hearing side hearing
Courts-regular 43% 24% 33%
procedure
Courts-provi- 30% 23% 47%
sional decisions I
Labour Relations 40% 30% 30%
Committees
The number of cases before the Labour Relations Committees (a few hun-
dred every year) have been declining over the last years. The importance
of the Committees in individual cases has become less important.
Besides this, there is also an informal procedure on the basis of the Act on
Equal Treatment. In every prefecture exists a Women's and Young Work-
er's Office. The director of this office is competent to give advice or in-
structions to parties in disputes with regard to gender discrimination
with regard to employment if either parties or one party asks for this. The
Director is also authorised to refer the dispute to the Equal Opportunity
Mediation Commission for mediation. Since a Revision of this Act in Feb-
ruary 2000, this is possible when either one or both of the parties con-
cerned apply for mediation and the Director considers mediations neces-
sary to settle the said dispute (article 13, paragraph 1 Act on Equal Treat-
ment). The Committee can make a proposal for mediation and recom-
mend this. This procedure was not very often followed in the past, partly
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because before 2000, both parties had to agree to do that. In 1996,
Nakakubo reported that since the enactment of this Act in 1995 there had
been only one case of initiated mediation under the Act, which also
failed. Since the Revision of the Act in 2000, only the consent of one party
is required. However, in the first case that was referred to the Commis-
sion after this Revision, the Japan Airline Affaire, the parties refused to
accept the proposal of the Commission.P
c. DEVELOPMENTS
In Japan, just like but even to a larger extent than in the Netherlands, em-
ployees are reluctant to go to a court. This gives a need for simple sys-
tems of dispute resolution. Therefore, since October 1, 1998, a new system
of administrative assistance for dispute resolution was introduced by an
amendment of the Labour Standards Act. Article 105-3 now provides that
the chief of the Prefectural Labour Standards Office may give advice or
instruction regarding a dispute over working conditions if one or both
parties to the dispute ask for assistance in its resolution. The Labour Stan-
dards Inspection offices ware in the past rather inspecting agencies than
neutral dispute resolution bodies. Their jurisdiction is also limited to mat-
ters specifically regulated under the Labour Standards Act. They may not
exercise authority over disputes including such issues as whether a dis-
charge is an abuse of the employer's right, since the Act does not have a
provision regulating reasons for discharge. The jurisdiction of the new
system is still limited because it does not cover disputes with regard to
equal employment opportunity, over which the Women's and Young
worker's Offices have jurisdiction.
In 1998 a rewritten Civil Procedure Code was introduced. This new
Code established small claim procedures covering cases under 300.000
20 With thanks to Professor Kanto OWADA of Shiga University, for providing this in-
formation.
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Yen.21 The cases are heard and decided within one day. This could be in-
teresting for labour disputes as well. 22
4. Comparison and evaluation
Japan and the Netherlands both have several informal procedures, next
to the ordinary formal procedures. Although part of the raison d'etre of
the informal procedures are the shorter period they are supposed to take,
the practice in both cases is not that simple. This explains why in both
countries formal as well as informal procedures are chosen by parties for
strategic reasons.
Japan's most important informal procedures are with regard to unfair
labour practices, which is related to union discrimination. In practice, this
has been developed into a procedure with a wider scope. In the Nether-
lands, the RDA dismissal-procedure is the predominant informal proce-
dure. In both cases, the informal procedure is not an initiative of private
parties, but officially promoted by the government.
The distinction between formal and informal procedures is often not
so large: formal procedures in labour law are made more accessible with
informal elements; informal procedures tend to formalise. A high case-
load may lead to further formalisation (more rules of procedure, more
substantive rules for predictability, less place for equity). In practice the
difference between the two seems often marginal.
A specific element is the participation of social partners (employers
and unions) in making case-law. In the informal procedures like the
RDA-procedure in the Netherlands and the Labour Commissions in
Japan, there is some involvement of social partners. The purpose of this
element may be twofold: on the one hand it aims to guarantee that the
decisions substantially are in line with the needs of practice, and that the
decision-makers are aware of the relevant labour relations, customs, and
21 See also the contribution of Professor OKINO to this publication.
22 With thanks to professor Takashi ARAKI of Tokyo University for some information
on actual developments.
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industrial problems. On the other hand their presence should shape con-
fidence in the bodies that decide. The fact that both interest groups are
represented will make the decisions more acceptable in itself. With a
paraphrase on the famous criterion for the impartiality of judges: justice
must not only been done, but also seen to been done (by the social part-
ners). Whether this involvement in practice really is so meaningful, is
often a well-kept secret.P
The reason to choose for informality in Japan is often that it improves
the chances for a successful mediation. In the Netherlands, mediation is
becoming more popular today. However, in individual labour disputes it
is not often used. The reason is, that in case of dismissal the Social Insur-
ance Authorities will demand that the official (formal or informal) proce-
dures are followed. It may be worthwhile to examine how mediation in
the Netherlands Labour Law could get more support.
In the end it may be concluded that both Japan and the Netherlands
do still not have found the definitive receipt for a satisfying way of solv-
ing labour disputes informally and rapidly. The introduction of more in-
ternal complaint procedures could be helpful in the Netherlands. Media-
tion may become of increasing importance in both countries in the future.
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